1.1. Introduction
The Contents
In the past few years there has been a resurgence of interest in discrete models of computation that are allowed to act transfinitely. Such conceptual machines act in simple steps or stages, and have as a paradigm the standard Turing machine. This, during its progress moves one cell at a time, to the left or the right along an unbounded tape that it is reading, and subsequently alters symbols, changes states and moves on. This paradigm has been with us for 70 years, and for much of this chapter we shall consider variants of such a device.
Our models will all be discrete acting computational digital models. We shall consider how Turing and other computing machines could possible behave when allowed to perform supertasks (by which we mean that they are allowed to complete an infinite sequence of tasks or operations). Such a machine is usually envisaged with an unbounded tape. If supertasks are allowed then naturally the whole of that tape comes into play, and we can imagine that tape already having some characteristic function written on it. The machine can then act on that tape and is then essentially a computer acting at a higher type, namely that of infinite sequences of 0, 1's, in other words of real numbers.
Surprisingly, even if one restricts one's model to, say, a register machine model, where the registers are finite in number with natural number entries, then simply defined behaviour at transfinite limit stages of computation lead to quite powerful decision procdures. This chapter will look at these as well. Whereas at the finite level the power of Turing and register machines is the same, at the transfinite level they diverge markedly. We shall not deal here with any machine that is, broadly speaking, an analog machine or computes in an analog fashion. Indeed apart from Section 2.1 we shall not be entering into any discussion of physical viabilities, feasibilities etc. We thus do not wish to discuss various machine proposals that could be seen to fall under the rubric we are setting ourselves, in that they seek to to compute functions whilst being constructed to conform to some ambient physical theory or constraint. We have in mind models such as Davies [Davies (2001)] , and the models of Beggs and Tucker [Beggs and Tucker (2007) ] that attempt to compute any set of natural numbers, by some kinematic-based device, and thus do so within a fragment of Newtonian mechanics; nor do we consider the interaction of standard machines with physically based 'advice' functions or oracles, such as is done in [Beggs et al. (2008) ]. We also shall not particularly consider classical quantum computation, as functions computed by such models are also turing computable.
Section 2.1 is somewhat of an exception, in that we do consider a particular construction in detail due to Etesi and Németi [Etesi and Németi (2002) ], and to Hogarth [Hogarth (1992) ], that allows Turing machines to be placed or arranged within particular spacetimes to allow for the algorithmic decision of Π 1 (and beyond) predicates without supertask phenomena. We can calculate somewhat precisely, the bounds to what can be computed in such models. We also recount the observation from [Welch (2008) ], that separability of the spacetime manifold puts a universal countable bound on formal systems of computation within that spacetime (under some mild assumptions).
A major lacuna is that we do not consider finite automata on infinite graphs, or in particular on infinite binary trees. This would have fitted well in any discussion of discrete models, and is admittedly a serious omission. Lastly this chapter is not about computation with an algebraic or structural flavour, and we include here, inter alia, the Blum, Shub, Smale model of computation on the reals ( [Blum et al. (1989) ]). Although we do want to consider computation on the reals, R is considered primarily as unordered Baire space, or Cantor space, and there is not any other algebraic or structural feature that distinguishes the models considered here.
Argument
In the 1960's and 70's much research was undertaken deriving ultimately from Kleene's theory ([Kleene (1959) ], [Kleene (1963) ]) of recursion in higher types (Generalized Recursion Theory, Kleene Recursion) , and the pioneering work of Aczel, Gandy, Moschovakis amongst others, that would lead to Spector classes, the theory of inductive definitions, and the theory of admissible sets, Barwise, Kripke, Platek.) Our motivation is that we wish to revisit some of these older theories and results and see how some recent activity in a class of models of computation fits in the older picture. Some of these later models are no more than familiar models with different style of inputs (register machines on ordinals say); others such as Infinite Time Turing Machine of Hamkins and Kidder ([Hamkins and Lewis (2000) ]) are versions of the standard model adapted to enable larger computations to be performed by allowing transfinite sequences of operations or stages; yet a third class simply consists of 'standard computation' placed in an unconventional framework (Turing machines stacked up, or regarded as inhabiting particular spacetimes). We want to see how these models fit in with our conceptions of recursion and computation formed in the earlier period.
We emphasise the logico-mathematical part of this, in particular the descriptive set theoretical descriptions. No apology is needed for this: to understand the model is to understand what the model produces: if this transcends that produced by finitary operations (in whatever form) then we are obliged to consider the underlying set-theoretical fundamentals. We consider further in Section 5 the connections of the computation models to the theory of inductive definitions (either monotone or not), and to subsystems of second order arithmetic. We do not consider this an accurate account on historical principles and we do not even claim to do justice to the concepts and individuals involved, but are merely taking a snapshot, as we rush past a fast-evolving subject.
Computation on Integers
We start ahistorically in terms of the published literature, but with a fact that surely must have been known to early recursion theorists such as Post: that allowing a Turing machine to at least run out indefinitely allows for the printing of the characteristic function not just of the halting problem (as a complete Σ 1 -set) but of a ∆ 2 -set. This has been called 'truth in the limit'.
A Turing machine may answer any Π 1 -question, if it is allowed ω-many stages: given a recursive predicate R(v 0 , v 1 ) we may program a machine to investigate in turn R(0, n), R(1, n), . . . , R(k, n) . . . in turn, and if for some k ¬R(k, n), then we require it to halt with a "0" for "no" as output. If the machine does not halt, then were we able to "transcend time" we could look back and say that the machine verified ∀v 0 R(v 0 , n). If we assume the machine has an output tape as well as a scratch tape, and if we assume the output tape starts out with every cell having a "1" written to it, we could dovetail all the queries ?∀v 0 R(v 0 , n)? for each n, and have the machine change a 1 to a 0 as soon as it verified that ∀v 0 R(v 0 , n) failed. Then after ω many stages, if we still could look at the output tape, we'd have written the characteristic function of the Π 1 set A = df {n | ∀v 0 R(v 0 , n)}. If we asked the question, Is A non-empty? this is a Σ 2 -query:
We cannot, in general, answer this, without allowing ourselves some further infinitary operation.
Putnam, much later, made the following definition: [Putnam (1965) ]) P is a trial and error predicate if and only if there is a general recursive function f such that for every
Putnam asked, and answered, the question as to the complexity in the arithmetical hierarchy of such predicates: they are ∆ 2 = Σ 2 ∩ Π 2 in the arithmetical hierarchy. We obtain the truth of P (x 1 , . . . , x n ) "in the limit" as y −→ ∞.
If we imagine the recursive function f as being computed by a Turing machine M writing its 0/1 output to a particular cell C 0 on its tape, the clauses above amount to a prescription of M 's behaviour on any input x 1 , . . . , x n that the contents of the cell C 0 , after computing in turn
. ., "settles down" as y increases: it must be either eventually 1/0 depending. We may thus rephrase Putnam as: P ⊂ N n is a trial and error predicate if there is a Turing machine M 0 so that
Continuing with this model for a moment, one sees that if there is in advance a fixed bound on the number of alternations that M 0 makes on the output cell C 0 's value, then that knowledge allows us to compute the characteristic functions of predicates in particular levels of the difference hierarchy of Σ 1 sets. Briefly: we say that P ( x) is in the k'th level of the difference hierarchy, if there are Σ 1 sets Q 0 , . . . , Q 2k−1 with P ( x) ↔ i≤k (Q 2i−2 ( x)∧¬Q 2i−1 ( x)); if we specify that M 0 may only write to the cell C 0 at most 2k +1 times, then M 0 may decide P ( x). Note that it is the fixity of the value k that determines the complexity within the class of Boolean combinations that is capable of being decided by such an arrangement. However even allowing k to be unbounded, is not quite sufficient. The following can be shown.
Fact There is the possibility of using the output of one Turing Machine as input to another. For functions on integers, this could be regarded as just composition of recursive functions. If we allow the output of a machine after ω many stages, either as a truth-in-the-limit operation or otherwise then we can display this as an infinitary operation on an infinite sequence of 0's and 1's (or whatever the alphabet of the machine is). How one does this, or under what preconditions one allows such models to be considered depends on how fastidiously one takes exception to 'supertasks', the latter being roughly defined here as a process that at some stage has completed infinitely many subtasks.
We now consider various mechanisms for this.
Transcending the finite through stacking Turing Machines
One obvious objection to an infinitely running process is the 'Thomson Lamp' ([Thomson (1954-55) Pitowsky [Pitowsky (1990) ] gave an account of an attempt to define spacetimes in which the effect of infinitely many computational tasks could be seen by an observer O r in that spacetime. (By 'spacetime' we mean here a Hausdorff, paracompact, Riemannian manifold which is a solution to the Einsteinian GR equations -we refer the reader to [Hawking and Ellis (1973) ].) He used the example of the, at the time, unresolved Fermat's Last Theorem but we can consider any other task that involves looking at a Π 0 1 question: for example, the consistency of the axioms of Peano Arithmetic, or Goldach's Conjecture, both of which involve a simple universal quantifier ∀n over a recursive predicate. Let us take the latter: another observer O q performs the tasks of checking that each even number in turn is the sum of two primes. This they do along their worldline γ 1 , the proper time of which is infinite (as each calculation takes some finite unit of time). If they find a counterexample they send a signal to O p travelling along her worldline γ 2 . The point of the example is to arrange that the proper time of γ 2 is finite, and has the the whole of γ 1 in her chronological past. As Earman and Norton [Earman and Norton (1993) ] mention, there are problems with this account not least that along γ 1 O p must undergo unbounded acceleration. Since then more sophisticated spacetimes due to Hogarth [Hogarth (1992) ] and Etesi & Németi [Etesi and Németi (2002) ], have been devised. For the moment we follow formally [Earman and Norton (1993) ] to define: This seemingly makes no reference to the word-line of the observer O p travelling along their path γ 2 , but they point out that there will be in any case such a future-directed timelike curve γ 2 passing through a point q ∈ I − (p) to p such that γ 2 (q,p) dτ < ∞, with q chosen to lie in the causal future of the past endpoint of γ 1 . The important point is that the whole of γ 1 lies in the chronological past of O p . As Hogarth showed in [Hogarth (1992) ] such spacetimes are not globally hyperbolic, thus ruling out many standard space-times (such as Minkowski space-time). (See [Earman and Norton (1993) ] for a discussion on global hyperbolicity and a family of Penrosian Causal Censorship Hypotheses in this context -this is a interesting debate on how one might add extra axioms to GR to limit the types of spacetimes permissible -but would take this chapter too far off course.)
To obtain a spacetime as above, they take Minkowski spacetime N 0 = (R 4 , η ab ) and choose a scalar field Ω which is everywhere equal to 1 outside of a compact set C, and which rapidly goes to +∞ as the point r is approached. The point r is removed and the MH spacetime is then N = (R 4 \{r}, g ab ), where g ab = Ω 2 η ab . Ω and γ 1 can be chosen so that γ 1 is a timelike geodesic. This 'toy' spacetime is pictured on the left. Earman and Norton discuss various possible spacetimes already in the literature that conform to being MH: Gödel spacetimes are MH but are causally 'vicious'; anti-de Sitter spacetime is MH, but fails a strong energy condition; Reissner-Nordstrom spacetime meets this, but as in all MH spacetimes there is divergent blue-shift of the signal to O p ; further, of the unbounded amplification of signals that O p may have to receive, etc., etc. Again this is beyond the terms of our discussion here, and apart from the rotating Kerr black hole solution of Etesi & Németi [Etesi and Németi (2002) ] to which we shortly turn, our aim is only to analyse the logico-mathematical possibilities inherent in these models.
Etesi & Németi's rotating black hole model
The authors consider an observer sent axially into the region containing a rotating black hole of a certain size, and rotating at certain speeds -a Kerr solution. The first notable feature of such a black hole is that the primary singularity is ring-formed around the axis of rotation (see [Hawking and Ellis (1973)] Initially, the orbiting machine and O p , should send and receive respectively, a single signal: the witness to the failure of the Π 1 predicate under inspection. They further remark though (their Prop. 2) that in fact the computational arrangement allows deciding queries ?n ∈ R? for sets R slightly more complicated than Π 1 or Σ 1 : R can be taken as a union of a Σ 1 and a Π 1 set for example. Indeed they indicate an argument (at their Proposition 3), that if the machine-observer O m is allowed to send k different signals, (they take k = 2) then any k-fold Boolean combination of Σ 1 and Π 1 sets R = i<k−1 (S i ∪ P i ) (with S i ∈ Σ 1 and P i ∈ Π 1 ) can be decided. They ask how far in the arithmetical hierarchy this can kind of argument can be taken. The discussion above concerning ∆ 2 predicates shows: Theorem 1.1. [Welch (2008) We have seen (at the Fact above) that for a ∆ 2 predicate R there is no recursive bound on the input n as to how many times the machine will have to change its mind concerning whether n ∈ R, and a fortiori no fixed in advance finite bound. Of course for checking whether any one n is in R, finitely many signals will suffice; hence only if the architecture of the experiment allows for potentially unboundedly many signals, then (and only then) can ∆ 2 predicates be decided, still without breaking Assumption 1 .
Hogarth's Arithmetically Deciding Spacetime Regions
Hogarth names a "unit" or "region" of spacetime that is capable of deciding a Π 1 question as above a "SAD 1 spacetime or region", and as a shorthand denotes it by the right hand diagram above at Fig 1. 1. Hogarth in [Hogarth (1994) ], (and in the later [Hogarth (2004) ]) stacks up such regions to finite depths in order to answer Π n queries.
If a spacetime contains a sequence
then O is said to form a past temporal string or just string. To decide membership in a Π 2 -definable set of integers P (n) ≡ ∀a∃bQ (a, b, n) he then stacks up a string of regions taking each O j as a SAD 1 region, each looking like the component of the right of Figure 1 .1, with O 0 being used to decide ∃bQ (0, b, n) . If this fails a signal is sent out to O p ; but if this is successful, a signal is sent to O 1 to start to decide ∃bQ (1, b, n) etc. Ultimately, putting this all together, again O p receives a signal if ¬P (n), or else knows after a finite interval that P (n).
It should be noted that
Assumption 2 The open regions O j are disjoint and still that no observer or part of the machinery of the system has to send or receive infinitely many signals (thus the "no swamping" assumption is kept). This whole region is then dubbed a "SAD 2 " spacetime.
A "SAD n+1 " spacetime is defined accordingly as composed from an infinite string of (again disjoint) SAD n regions O n , again all in the past of some point p. (Earman and Norton [Earman and Norton (1996) ] show that a SAD 1 spacetime cannot decide Π 2 statements, and Hogarth [Hogarth (2004) ] follows this up with the generalisation that SAD j cannot decide Π j+1 statements.) In the Figure 2 .2 below, on the right is the underlying tree structure of a SAD 3 region for computing queries of the form ?n ∈ A? for some Σ 3 set A: each large circle represents a SAD 2 region (which in turn contains a string of infinitely many of the small circles -pictured by the terminal nodes of the tree -representing the SAD 1 regions) which can be used for computing the answers to Σ 2 queries. Correspondingly, in Figure  1 .2, if each O n is a SAD j region then the diagram on the left is that of an SAD j+1 region. In Fig.1 .2, each region O n contains itself an ω sequence of SAD 1 regions which are shown in (the enlarged) circles of the tree.
We thus have that Π n+1 questions can be decided by allowing nested stacks of suitable SAD regions to depth n (if we define the depth of the simplest region in Fig. 1 .1 as being 0). He then puts these altogether: Of course there are many unresolved difficulties with this. There is a recognition problem: how, for example, could one ever recognise an AD spacetime region if such existed? Let alone one equipped with appropriate ranks of Turing machines coordinated and ready to go?
We now see how to go beyond Hogarth and observe that there is really no reason for us to stop at arithmetic. Hogarth has defined regions SAD n+1 containing stacked SAD n subregions to a fixed finite depth n. He thus has used a subset of the class of finite path trees to label his regions. In the next definition N <N denotes the set of all finite sequences of natural numbers.
N N denotes the set of all such infinite sequences from N to N. We assign ordinal ranks to the nodes of a finite path tree (which are necessarily wellfounded) by recursion: the rank of T is then the rank of the empty sequence, (), the topmost node. A tree is in general infinitely splitting (a given node sequence node u in N <N may have in-finitely many immediate one step extensions), even though all branches are of finite length; hence ranks of nodes can in general be infinite, but of countable ordinal height (for an account of this and the following context, see e.g. [Rogers (1967) ] Sect.15.2). Finite path trees in general can be used to describe the construction of the Borel Sets on spaces such as
A space, taken for simplicity as, N × N N has a topology constructed from basic open sets typically of the form
It is well known that this hierarchy is built up progressively through ω 1 many stages (where ω 1 is the first uncountable cardinal), and then no further sets are added (that is Σ ω 1 = Π ω 1 = Σ ω 1 +1 ). Of particular interest is the hyperarithmetical hierarchy which is in one sense the constructive part of the Borel hierarchy. Here the construction of the Borel set is given by a recursive finite path tree (meaning the tree T and its extension relation < T are given by computable functions) with a recursive assignment of recursively open sets to the bottommost rank 0 nodes, that is to the leaves of the tree. Membership then in an hyperarithmetic set of integers (that is taking l = 0 in the above) is given by testing a recursive protocol of queries. Already one construal of Hogarth's AD spacetime region is that it is capable in the above notation of answering questions concerning some unions of arithmetic sets, S ∈ Σ ω . Why 'some' ? Because the description of the union n A n must be given to us in an effective, i.e. recursive way. The upshot is that for any hyperarithmetic set H ⊆ N there could be constructed a spacetime region SAD H for which queries ?n ∈ H? could be answered. Such a region satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 and consists of SAD regions of smaller rank stacked according to the recursive finite path tree description for the construction of H.
A discussion and the details of the above can be found in [Welch (2008) ]. Can a "hyperarithmetically deciding spacetime" by analogy with Hogarth's AD deciding spacetime be constructed? It can, if we can enumerate those turing programs that describe hyperarithmetic set building protocols. Here we piece together regions that are "S ei -deciding" just as the ADdeciding region is built. Given input i, n to an initial control machine, it activates S e i and asks if ?n ∈ S e i ? Of course this query will result in subqueries activating regions of lower rank down the tree coded by e i which are themselves S ej -deciding etc.
At this point the reader will well, I think, object that the recognition problem has now got well out of hand: the collection of indices e i | i ∈ N enumerating hyperarithmetic set constructions is itself well beyond recursive or arithmetic, forming as it does a Π 1 1 -complete set of integers. However it is worth emphasising that no machine in this tree array is itself performing "supertasks" (i.e. performing infinitely many actions in its own proper time), but if it issues a signal to another process, it does so only once after a finite amount of its own proper time. It is simply that the overall tree no longer has a recursive description, and its ordinal rank is no longer a recursively given ordinal. We have not violated our two core assumptions. However the point should be that anthropomorphic considerations are being put aside and we are calculating what is feasible given the kind of techniques Hogarth contemplates. We have here what might be called a hyperarithmetic computer .
A universal constant upper bound for any computation
Nevertheless if we take this discussion to its logical conclusion, one might ask how far could one possibly go building regions of higher and higher complexity without violating the core idea?
There is in any case a bound on the depth of any finite path tree to which we can assign MH regions without violating Assumption 2 . Definition 1.6. Let M = (M, g ab ) be a spacetime. We define w(M) to be the least ordinal η so that M contains no SAD region whose underlying tree structure has ordinal rank η.
Here a zero value w(M) implies that M contains no SAD regions whatsoever, that is, is not MH; the upper bound is for the trivial reason that every finite path tree is a countable object and so cannot have uncountable ordinal rank. QED This is just the usual argument that separability of the real continuum R implies that any family of disjoint intervals of R must be countable. Consequently if M actual is our spacetime, (modelled using these basic assumptions) then w(M actual ) is a constant giving an upper bound to the complexity of MH regions, and so putative computations performable in M actual . Dropping either of the Hausdorff or paracompactness properties from our list of properties of manifolds would seemingly result in unrecognizable (in current terms) 'spacetimes'. In short, although MH-spacetimes allow, at the most generous, for a reorganisation of any countable length computation (in some formalism, such as Turing machines) into one computation using trees of countable depth, this would be impossible for uncountably long (or many) computations whose stages occupy discrete spacetime regions. The same restriction would of course be true for any other system, or arrangement, of computations and is nothing to do with Hogarth style formalizations: this holds for any separable manifold and any generalised computation that requires a disjoint region of spacetime for each step or unit of computation. Somewhat more formally:
some formal mechanism of computation, such that each computation step of the mechanism occupies a disjoint open neighbourhood of the manifold. Then there is a countable upper bound w(M, F) to the lengths of the F-computations in M.
The Proposition is not a completely precise mathematical statement, since we have not defined 'formal mechanism', but the point we hope should be clear. We have not specified 'step' or 'unit' but again this can mean a Turing machine instruction step, or a cell unit. Anything that occupies a discrete interval in space-time, whether it be an MH-spacetime, (so as to avoid supertask like phenomena), or in other spacetimes more generally with supertasks envisaged: one cannot in advance arrange the formalism to occupy uncountably many distinct open neighbourhoods. Hence the bound. If we are allowed to play God and are handed a separable manifold and (a set of integers coding) a countable ordinal α, in advance, then indeed we could cook up an MH manifold to accommodate computations of that length (of proper time), using stacked Turing machines, or any other form of computational model F. What we cannot have is one manifold M that will work for our chosen F for all countable α.
Allowing supertasks
By means of using spacetime regions of a particular type the Etesi-Németi and Hogarth models avoid considering any supertasks, where any observer has performed infinitely many tasks in his or her chronological past. If we relax this constraint we may ask of our computing machines what they are capable of when given some well-defined behaviour in the transfinite. Amusingly even simple machines can perform a lot.
Punch hole machines
We first consider a simple kind of turing machine. We envisage such a machine as having a tape, infinite in one direction, thus with a leftmost starting cell, and a read/write head traversing the tape in the usual fashion. The alphabet of the machine is simple: it consists of a blank and a '0'. The latter we can think of as a hole that the machine punches. Thus the machine can only write once, or punch a hole, in a cell; otherwise it 'reads' and moves a cell left or right in the usual fashion. The program or transition table for such a machine is simply that of an ordinary machine of this architecture.
We have to specify what happens at stage ω and subsequent stages. There are several possibilities: but let us say that we simply allow the machine to run for ω many stages, then consider what is on the tape (a potentially infinite sequence of holes and blanks) as input to be fed back into the machine at its starting state again for the next ω many stages. We thus reset the R/W head to first leftmost cell, and let it run the program afresh.
So, ignoring difficulties with "hanging chads", such cells are usable once only. One easily sees that in ω steps again ∆ 2 , or trial-and-error predicates are decidable. One may simply arrange that any new calculation extends beyond the scratch area of tape already used up. If one has a ∆ 2 predicate P (v 0 ) it is not hard to arrange this so that a machine will punch holes (using additional blank gaps) on an output 'sub-tape' so that the correct final 0/1 value is recorded. Now we have allowed the possibility to reset the head to its starting position, and let the machine continue running. We let ourselves do and re-do this process, at every limit stage in time, pulling the head back to the start position and letting it work on the accumulated tapefull of punch holes. Could we calculate more? For which predicates P (n) of natural numbers n is there a machine of this kind that halts for a given n with the correct P (n)\¬P (n) answer? These machines were first considered by Hamkins and Kidder but they discarded them as too weak, in favour of the Infinite Time Turing Machine to follow. Surprisingly perhaps, they can still calculate quite a lot: we have the following observation (due to S-D.Friedman and the author). Calling the above arrangement an "infinite punch tape machine", it is not hard to demonstrate:
. (i) Precisely the arithmetical predicates are decidable by infinite punch tape machines; (ii) any computation either halts by, or is in an infinite loop, by time ω
2 .
Infinite Time Register Machines (ITRM)
Koepke and Miller [Koepke and Miller (2008) ] consider the following register machine model. M N is a Shepherdson-Sturgis register machine (see [Shepherdson and Sturgis] , or as described in, e.g. Cutland [Cutland (1980) ]). M N has N registers R i (i < N ) each of which may contain a natural number. Suppose that the program under consideration has instruction set I = I 0 , . . . , I q . Let us say that at time t R i contains R i (t) ∈ N, and that instruction I(t) is about to be performed. We adopt a slightly more subtle behaviour than that for the punch-hole machines. We consider the state list q 0 , q 1 , . . . , q p of the machine and at time λ where λ is any limit ordinal, we say that the machine will next perform the instruction numbered I(λ) = df lim inf α−→λ I(α) where I(α) is the instruction number about to be performed at time α. This formulation has the rather pleasant effect of placing the machine at time λ, at the start of the outermost nested loop that it entered (if any) unboundedly often before time λ. We have to assign register values, and here of course a register may have changed value infinitely often.
For i < N we set:
It is this 'resetting' of a register that gives the model its strength. We may additionally consider such a machine to be able to consult an oracle: thus there is an instruction, so that if Z ⊆ N, a register can be reset to 0 if R i (α) ∈ Z. Computations relative to an oracle Z can be regarded in this manner as using the set Z as an input; the infinite time available allows all of Z to be consulted. We discuss the strength of this model below, but again surprisingly complicated predicates can be calculated.
Infinite Time Turing Machines (ITTM)
This model, due to Hamkins and Kidder, awakened recent interest in transfinite computational models. It was designed in the 90's but an account of them only appeared in [Hamkins and Lewis (2000) ] much later. We give a computationally equivalent version to that of their original model -and discuss the differences afterwards.
We go back to the punch-hole machine described above, but we now consider what to do if the machine is allowed to reuse cells. Clearly a cell may then be reused infinitely often and we must define a behaviour for it. We consider Turing machines with an alphabet of just three letters: 0,1, and B (for blank). We suppose that its standard program has states q 0 , . . . , q k . The read/write head moves according to the description given by the usual transition table, but that also uses the liminf of cell positions that it has been reading at limit stages of time to calculate its position at a limit stage, (if this liminf of the r/w head positions is infinite at a limit stage, then the head is set back by fiat to the starting cell C 0 ). Further we set the state q(λ) at limit times to be the liminf of previous states. (This has the same effect of course of positioning the r/w head at outermost loops as it did for ITRM's.) If the cells of the machine are enumerated C i | i ∈ N with values at time ν denoted by C i (ν) | i ∈ N then we set at limit time λ:
Thus if the machine has changed its mind unboundedly often below λ about the cell value then, this is set to a blank -for ambiguity if you will. Programs, are simply standard turing machine ones, and may be enumerated as P e | e ∈ N . If a particular program P e halts, then we can consider the contents of the tape the output of that machine. We may also prime the tape with an infinite string x from the alphabet, and consider P e (x) to be the computation of the e'th program on input x.
Such machines can decide Π 1 1 -predicates. We illustrate by means of the complete Π 1 1 -predicate on integers: those e ∈ N so that the e'th (standard) recursive function, {e} = f , computes the characteristic function of a wellorder of N. Given input e the machine simulates the e'th standard turing program and writes the output characteristic function on, say the cells of the tape C i where i ≡ 0(mod 3). The other cells are blank for scratch work. This takes ω many stages. When this is complete, the machine then checks the Π 2 -condition of this characteristic function f coding a discrete linear ordering. (This is of the form ∀n∃mR(n, m, f ) and R is recursive. This can be verified in ω steps, by starting with n = 0, recording '0' on the scratch tape cells C i where i ≡ 1(mod 3) , searching for an m, using the scratch tape cells C i where i ≡ 2(mod 3), for auxiliary calculation, then proceeding to n = 1 if successful, etc. ) If this test is passed, we have an order < e ; we then need to test for wellorderedness. We wipe clean the scratch tape area, and search for the < e 'th least element of the ordering. We may do this by simply guessing a least element on a scratch tape, and then continually revising our guess < e -downwards each time we find a lesser one. If after ω many steps we did not find such then we did not have a wellorder, and we can output a 0; if after ω many steps we only changed our minds finitely often, then we indeed located the < e -least element, say it was 23, and we have it written concretely on the scratch tape. We now proceed through the code function f and erase all mention of the element 23. This leaves us with a new code f of a discrete linear order written on the cells C 3i | i ∈ N , and we simply now repeat this process. There are only two outcomes: either at some point we arrived at the situation where the 'current' linear order is illfounded, and we discover this fact, by descending through it infinitely often looking for its least element, or else we end up emptying out the C 3i cells for i ∈ N completely: after looking through this slice of the tape, and seeing it is empty (which takes a final ω many steps) we verify that it was truly wellfounded. If the order type of the ordering was α then this has been achieved in, rather roughly, ω + ω.α + ω many steps.
Once the reader has convinced themselves of this, it is not hard to imagine programs that write out successfully on some slice of the scratch tape (which we might as well call 'output tape') those e i with {e i } ∈ W O. Moreover, one can also imagine a machine coding the ordinal sum of all the recursive ordinals α < ω ck 1 and outputting a code for that, i.e. ω ck 1 , on the output tape. However as Hamkins and Lewis showed, and we shall see later, this is only scratching the surface.
Suppose we denote by P e (n) the e'th computation on integer input of n, represented by an infinite string of n 1's followed by an infinite string of 0's. Several natural questions arise.
Q1 [Hamkins and Lewis (2000)] first developed the theory of such machines, using the analogy of the standard turing machine as a source of the notion of recursion: they note that there are versions of the Recursion Theorems, and the Snm-Theorem for this notion of computation and there is a universal machine with a universal program. Much of the standard development proceeds very smoothly but of course there are considerable differences: for Turing machines the whole run of a halting computation, the snapshots of the states and of tape's contents etc. can be encoded by an single integer; it is thus of the same type as the objects on which it operates. However for ITTM's, computations P e (n) on integer input, are in general a transfinite sequence S = S β | β ≤ α of snapshots of the cell values C i (β) | i < ω at each stage β ≤ α. A computation is then an infinite object and must be coded in this context by a set of integers or a 'real' number. (One uses reals that code wellorderings of length α + 1 and attaches by pairing functions the snapshots to the nodes of the wellorder, together with any auxiliary information such as machine state etc. along the way). Computations are thus of different types from the integer inputs. A central representation of standard turing machines comes via Kleene's T -predicate, yielding a canonical Normal Form Theorem. This theorem allows one to proceed effectively from e, and uniformly in n, from a halting computation of the form P e (n) ↓ to a program e so that P e (n) ↓ will halt, and moreover produce an integer output which codes the whole course-of-computation that demonstrates P e (n) ↓. For such a notion to work in this new area we should need the program P e to be capable of producing the reals needed to code the potentially transfinitely many steps in calculations such as that of P e (n) ↓. The answer turns out, thankfully, to be affirmative, (it follows from the λ, ζ, Σ-Theorem below, [Welch (2000) ]). We refer the reader not to the original papers, but to [Welch (2009) ] for a later but somewhat tidier account of this theorem and the answers to the above three questions.
From this one gets the desired representation theorem (where P e (n) refers to ITTM computation). Theorem 1.2. (Normal Form Theorem I [Welch (2004) ], [Welch (2009) ]) ∀e∃e ∀n ∈ N P e (n) ↓−→ (P e (n) ↓ y where y ∈ 2 N codes a wellordered course-ofcomputation sequence for P e (x) ↓).
Moreover the map e −→ e is effective (in the usual Turing sense).
There is a higher type version obtained by relativising all the results (now for λ x , ζ x etc.) above to real number inputs. Part (b) below is simply a variant form stated to be reminiscent of the Kleene T -predicate. We let ϕ e be the (partial) function computed by P e . 
The effectivity is again established in the same way, noting that the input (whether n ∈ N or x ∈ 2 N ) does not affect the above description of an algorithm in any dynamic way.
However the proof that all clockable ordinals are writable proceeds via an analysis of how each single cell C i behaves during the course of a computation P e (n). In general cells may stabilize on some fixed value, or forever change value. The same is true for infinite sub-segments of the ITTM tape. Suppose we reserve cells C i (i ≡ 2 mod 3) for "output" then we say that a real y ∈ 2 N is 'eventually computable' if there is an ITTM computation P e (n) -which is not required to halt -but which has y as the characteristic function of the output tape from some point in time onwards. The notion is then that a computation need not formally halt in order to 'produce' an output: it is sufficient that the output tape segment be stable from some point onwards. Hamkins and Lewis called an ordinal α eventually writable, if there was an eventually computable y α ∈ 2 N coding α. Clearly we can consider any halting computation a special case of an eventually stable one, and thus if λ is the supremum of all writable ordinals, and ζ the supremum of the eventually writable ordinals then λ < ζ. Evaluating λ, ζ turned out to be tied up with calculating stabilisation points of cells C i in the universal machine calculations, and the following characterisation is possible. 
(iv) then λ is the least ordinal satisfying:
We thus have a clear picture of the action of ITTM computations on integers. The machines run using very constructive rules, even for the limit stages, so their action is of course absolute to Gödel's constructible universe L. As [Hamkins and Lewis (2000) ] had noted, if an ITTM machine has its hands on a real y coding an ordinal α then there is a standard turing machine program for using that code to run a construction of the L-hierarchy 'along' that ordering y, thereby producing a real code for the α'th level L α . Hence the tie up with L is natural. A further observation on the λ, ζ, Σ-Theorem is in order. The machine limit rules of liminf can be expressed in a Σ 2 way. If one has two levels of the L hierarchy satisfying L ζ ≺ Σ 2 L Σ then running the universal machine inside L it is pretty much immediate that the machine's snapshots at time ζ and Σ will be identical: this is what the elementarity entails. The machine will then either have halted, or, as one can show, has entered an eternally repeating loop (although the elementarity assumed is suggestive of this, in fact the latter still has to be shown). It turns out the the pair (ζ, Σ) is the lexicographically least pair of ordinals where the universal machine has identical snapshots, and first enters an infinite loop.
What further seems to emerge from the proofs above, is that the primary notion here is not that of a 'halted computation' but of a 'stable computation': there are computations of the form P e (n) which do not formally halt, but eventually have a settled output tape, and thereafter just footle around for ever on their scratch tape areas. Halting is just a special case of stabilizing, and this is borne out by the fact that we cannot fully analyse halting computations without analyzing stabilizing ones. Halting can be expressed by a Σ 1 statement in set theory ("There exists a real y that successfully codes the course of computation of P e (n) with a last halting state"); this is at the basis of the Σ 1 characterisation of λ in the λ, ζ, Σ theorem as L λ ≺ Σ 1 L ζ , once we have discovered ζ. We may further establish theorems corresponding to those for halting computations.
The reader may have noticed that we seem to be avoiding discussion of the obvious fact that ITTM's can work on infinite input as well have infinite output: such computation is thus on one type up, on that of sets of integers, or reals themselves, rather than merely on integers. Before we turn to this we emphasise that Hamkins and Kidder's original formulation of an ITTM immediately visualised such capabilities: their machine was devised as coming equipped with three infinite tapes, for input, scratch and output. A single read/write head surveyed a single cell from each of the three tapes simultaneously and according to its state and program, would write from an alphabet set of {0, 1}. At limit stages a cell C i 's value was determined by taking the limsup of the previous cell values (there was no Blank character); the R/W head at limit stages would be brought back to the very first triplet of cells on the tapes, and the machine would enter a special 'limit state' q L . The differences between this arrangement and that sketched above play no role in determining the classes of functions or sets computed (either on integers or on reals which we are coming to): they are the same for either model. There are minor differences in calculating halting times, and in precisely which classes of ordinals are clockable -often by an obvious factor of ω or so, but apart from these finer details there are functionally no differences between the models proposed. (This discussion does conceal one remark, that in fact, a one tape machine with two symbols cannot produce the same class of computable functions f : R −→ R. However for functions of type f : R −→ N or f : N −→ N a one tape 2-alphabet machine turns out to be sufficient. For the wider class curiously a third character -which we have introduced here by the way of the Blank aboveturns out to be necessary. See [Hamkins and Seabold (2001) ] for a discussion of this somewhat technical point and proofs of these results mentioned.)
Computation on Reals
Kleene developed an equational calculus for developing the notion of recursion on a higher type object (see [Kleene (1978) ], [Kleene (1959) ], [Kleene (1963) ]). The relevant type here is Type 2 , the objects under consideration are functionals I : N N −→ N. This generalised his earlier equational calculus for (standard) recursive functions that used (characteristic functions for Type 1) oracles, I : N −→ N. The intuitive notion of a functional F being computable relative to I is that we have some kind of machine that can take inputs in the form of (finite sequences) of integers and reals, n, x, and which is connected to some oracle/memory device that has access to the graph of I -itself a set of size the continuum. As the domain of I is N N , the machine must compute a real x to present to the oracle, which will return I(x). Thus an infinite amount of computation must be performed in some scratch/storage area before this oracle query can be launched. A computation will thus in general be of infinite length, but is perhaps better thought of as given by an infinite tree where, for example, there may be infinite branching nodes: below the call for I(x) will be the prior individual computations for x(0), x(1), . . . . An illfounded tree, that is one with an infinite descending path, represents an undefined computation. There is some discussion of this in Rogers ([Rogers (1967) ], p. 406, where there is no oracle I discussed) but where the allusion is to an "ℵ 0 -mind' capable of forming such generalised machine computations. A crucial point is that a generalised computation step only be allowed to take previously, inductively, defined generalised steps. The resulting notion is 'hyperarithmetic computability'. (See also here [Kleene (1962b) ], [Kleene (1962a) ].)
With the addition of the oracle I it can thus be loosely characterised ( [Hrbacek and Simpson (1980) 
]) as a model of computation in which the computational device has a (i) countably infinite memory, and (ii) an ability to manipulate (search through, write to) that memory in finite time; and optionally (iii) an ability to quiz an oracle I about that memory contents (in a single step).
If the above is all done within the e'th program we call the above computation {e}( n, x, I) which again, may or may not halt. The following functional is essential for developing much of the regular theory of relative recursiveness. 0 if ∃nx(n) = 0 E(x) = { 1 otherwise The immediate import of this is that computation relative to the object E is closed under existential number quantification (for any I the class of relations semi-recursive in I is closed under universal number quantification). A second effect is that:
• If A is an arithmetical set of reals then A is recursive in E. More important consequences follow: if I is any functional such that E is recursive in I, then we have the full Ordinal Comparison Theorem for stages of computation (see [Moschovakis (1974) ]) which is crucial for developing the theory of relations semi-recursive in a type-2 functional. By 'relation' in the next theorem, we mean any predicate If we are considering relative recursion of a set of reals A ⊆ R in a set of reals B (which we may identify with its characteristic function oracle I B ) we may denote such:
x ∈ A {e}(x, B, E) ↓ 1 and say that 'A is recursive in B' if {e} gives a function total on inputs x, and then one has appropriate versions of the above theorem relativised to B. There is an appropriate notion of Kleene Degree: Definition 1.7. Kleene degrees: Let A, B ⊆ R; we say that A ≤ K B iff there is an index e and a real y so that for any
there is an index e and a real y so that for any x ∈ R (x ∈ A ←→ {e}(x, y, B, E) ↓ 1)).
The presence of the fixed real y ensures that the degree class of B contains continuum many sets of reals A; moreover the degree of B, being thus closed under continuous pre-images, forms a so-called Wadge degree. In general a computation evolves its own tree structure as it grows, according to its instruction set. But one can think of y as also contributing to some part of the computational tree structure. In this case, as y is allowed to vary, we see that 0 K contains ∅, R, and in fact consists of the Borel sets. 0 K (the K-degree of a complete Kleene semi-recursive set of reals) contains WO, the set of reals coding wellorders, and so a complete Π 1 1 set of reals. In fact it consists of all the co-analytic, so precisely the Π -to see whether the computation tree is wellfounded. Moreover, in admissibility theory wellfoundedness of any relation inside a transitive admissible set is actually a Σ 1 -notion. Here L ∈,Ẋ is the language of set theory augmented by a predicate symbolẊ -to be interpreted by B.
, and there is y ∈ R, so that for any
Thus to determine whether x ∈ A/x / ∈ A we perform Σ 1 -searches through the least admissible set L ω B,y,x 1 [B, y, x] relative to B containing y, x. As intimated equivalence with the former definition comes about through the original (relativised) theorem of Kleene 1.4 and the theory of admissible sets (cf. [Barwise (1975) 
]).
The generalised theory of recursion in higher types was much investigated and developed in the late 60's and 70's, with a history too rich to go into here, with names such as Gandy, Moschovakis, Sacks, Grilliot, Fenstad, Normann, Moldestad, Harrington prominent. The recursion relative to the single operator E is in one respect merely illustrative, being the historical example from the earlier days and papers ([Kleene (1959) ], [Kleene (1963) ], [Kleene (1978) ]) of the Kleene Equational Calculus. The reader may consult Hinman's [Hinman (1978) ] for an overall development of the theory, Fenstad [Fenstad (1980) ] for an attempt to present an axiomatic approach to general computation theories, and the latter Part D of Sacks [Sacks (1990) ] for the further development in relation to set recursion.
Mention must now be made of the connections to the theory of inductive definitions and here more particularly to the theory of Spector classes. The latter is a general unifying theory of definability developed by Moschovakis in [Moschovakis (1974) PW: For any P ∈ Γ there is σ : P −→ λ for some ordinal λ with the property that there are relations:
It would be impossible to give a full exposition of the import of Spector pointclasses here, but suffice it to say that the definition above encapsulates a fundamental unifying approach to the theory of inductive definability. Familiar Spector pointclasses are Π 
ITTM computations on reals
If we now return to the ITTM model we shall see that it fits very nicely into this overall general theory. We have a choice to make here. At Q3 above we called the decidable predicates, those where a characteristic function of the predicate could always be computed by a halting computation. It is natural particularly given the machine nature of the origins of the notion to think of halting as somehow fundamental, and therefore it is this that should be used to characterise 'decidability'. However here we are adopting the position that the fundamental feature of the ITTM's is the Σ 2 nature of the limit rule for the cell values, and the concomitant phenomenon of their having stabilized output without halting; it was indeed from this stabilizing and looping times, from ζ and Σ, that we could characterize the halting times. The halting computations are for this purpose to be regarded as the special sub-class of 'fully stabilized' computations: halting is just a special kind of stabilization (sic). This position is further strengthened when we consider below its relation to previous notions of higher type recursion.
We stated the Normal Form Theorems in the stronger, halting, version, as these would be more familiar to the reader, but there are equally well Normal Form Theorems which are verbatim as above but with ↓ replaced by ↑ throughout. The viewpoint here is that the strongly stabilizing, i.e. halting, computations should probably be thought to give rise to a notion of strong decidability (and strong semi-decidability) whilst the stabilizing computations correspond to the notion of decidability and semi-decidability. However most papers distinguish the 'stabilizing' form, with the adverb 'eventually', used in the form: 'eventually (semi)-decidable predicates' or adjectively as in 'eventual ITTM degrees' etc. This is established enough that it would egregious to go against it here.
However for notions from higher type recursion theory, one says in general that a class of 'semi-decidable sets are those semi-recursive in a F' where the latter F is some higher type functional. Then, for the appropriate F for ITTM's, actually 'semi-recursive in F' would correspond to the stabilizing behaviour rather than the halting one. This would also accord with the usage inherited from Kleene Recursion. We shall call here then "ITTM-semi-recursive" those predicates where membership facts can be represented as the stable output of some program, and thus corresponding to 'eventually semi-decidable' in the literature. (For different classes of machines such as the Σ n -machines mentioned below, the notion of 'output' becomes somewhat more rarified, but these too one we would like to think of as providing mathematical classes of sets that are generalised (semi-)recursive in some way.)
It is a conceptually simple adjustment to have within an ITTM program an oracle call that requests of some oracle B ⊆ R (here 2 N ) whether the current contents of the scratch tape, y ∈ 2 N , is an element of B, and receive a 0/1 reply. Thus computation relative to an oracle for sets of reals is unproblematic. We again adopt the same notation that P B e (x) ↓ y if the e'th machine with oracle B, on input x ∈ 2 N halts with output y ∈ 2 N . Changing the arrow to P B e (x) ↑ y indicates that eventually y is written to the output tape, and remains there unchanging from some point on. (We have to have some other notation such as "P B e (x) |" for the computation diverges or is undefined.)
We first give the integer version. Definition 1.9. A set of integers x is ITTM-semi-recursive in a set y if and only if:
(ii) A set of integers x is ITTM-recursive in a set y if and only if:
We may write x ∞ y for the reducibility ordering.
Equivalently: x is ITTM-recursive in y if both x and ¬x are ITTMsemi-recursive in y (since if the latter holds it is easy to amalgamate the two programs into a single program P e with the effect of the Definition. The relation ∞ is in the class ∆ 1 2 . There is a natural prewellordering that arises on computations P e establishing membership in some set x: put n ≺ m if the computation P e (n) ↑ 1 stabilizes to an output of 1 before that of P e (m) ↑ 1 does. The relation ≺ is itself ITTM-semi-recursive (think of the universal machine that observes the simulated copies of computation sequences of P e for various n -eventually it itself will stabilize into seeing that P e (n) stabilizes before P e (m)) and thus we can establish the prewellordering property very easily.
There is a natural notion of complete ITTM-semi-recursive set of integers: Definition 1.10.x = df {e | P e (0) ↑} -the complete set of stable indices.
The following tells us what this set is by way of a set theoretic characterisation. We regard x x as an analogy to the hyperjump operation.
This should be compared with Kleene's result that his notation system set O -a complete Π 1 1 set of integers coding indices of wellfounded finite path trees -is in fact (Turing-) recursively isomorphic to the Σ 1 -truth set of L ω ck 1 , ∈ . Indeed A. Klev has defined in [Klev (2007) ] an extension of Kleene's O to an O ++ , that mirrors exactly Kleene's original definition as a tree (indeed the tree is literally an extension of Kleene's). By the above, it is thus to the complete
The following is the natural version for real computation. Definition 1.11. A set of reals A is ITTM-semi-recursive in a set of reals B if and only if:
(ii) A set of reals A is ITTM-recursive in a set of reals B if and only if:
Notice in the above that we have included a parameter real y to ensure the closure under continuous preimages as before. This will ensure we have Wadge pointclasses and that the ensuing notion of ≤ ∞ -degree with the degree ordering induced, will be wellfounded. The structure of this degree ordering is dependent on the ambient set theory -we shall not go into this now, but under the assumption of "sufficient Determinacy" (that of two person perfect information games of sufficient complexity in their payoff sets) we shall have that the degrees are wellordered; under the assumption of V = L the ordering of ≤ ∞ degrees is very different, and below the complete ≤ ∞ -semi-recursive set of reals there are plenty of ≤ ∞ -incomparable sets (and hence Post's problem has a rich positive solution); whilst under "sufficient determinacy" assumptions, there are no intermediate degrees at all. This was to be expected, and serves only to confirm the position of the pointclass of ITTM semi-recursive sets as one within the totality of the Wadge ordering of all reasonable pointclasses of sets of reals. See [Welch (2004) ] for a further discussion and results.
By analogy with Kleene recursion we have:
The Lemma then identifies structures in which we can look to ascertain the outcomes of our ITTM computations relative to a set of reals B say. By way of analogy with ζ, the ordinal ζ B,y,x is the least that is not ITTM-(B, x, y)-recursive. It is thus also least such that L ζ B,y,x [B, y, x] has a proper Σ 2 -elementary end-extension.
Just as one has a Uniformisation Theorem for Kleene-semi-recursive sets (namely the Novikoff-Kondo-Addison Π 
Computation on ordinals, and ordinal length machines
In the 70's the theory of α-recursion coming out of the meta-recursion of the 60's reached its highest stage of development. The observation that an enumeration of a Π 1 1 -complete set of integers was very naturally effected, not in ω, but in ω ck 1 (the least non-recursive ordinal) steps led to a discussion on the role of hyperarithmetic visà vis finite. In meta-recursion the motivation was to have a generalization of recursion theory where infinitely long computations converged. Initially the emphasis had been on using an analogy between finite/recursive/recursively enumerable to yield a notion of meta-finite/metarecursive/meta-r.e. In the latter the integers would be replaced by recursive ordinals, and a meta-r.e. set was a set of recursive ordinals whose indices formed a Π 1 1 set. Meta-recursive sets would be those that were both meta-r.e. and co-meta-r.e. The notion that replaced finiteness, was that of meta-finiteness which was to be identified with a set of ordinals together with a hyperarithmetic index set. In particular the domain of computation had now changed: instead of ω it would become ω ck 1 . (See, e.g. , the discussion in [Sacks (1990) ] Part V for an account of this development.) This was not the first generalisation of recursion theory to ordinals: Takeuti [Takeuti (1960) ] had replaced 'recursive enumerability' by a scheme equivalent to Σ 1 -definability and was the first to generalise recursion theory from natural numbers to ordinals. There were a number of developments from Kleene's equational calculus to include ordinal valued functions in equations: Machover [Machover (1961) ], Levy [Levy (1963) ], Tugué [Tugué (1964) ], Kripke [Kripke (1964) ], Platek [Platek (1966) ] all had such calculi. The latter two involved what emerged as a primary notion, that of an admissible ordinal with the concomitant axiomatisation of admissible set theory as a fragment of full ZFC set theory. Platek had the notion of an admissible set. From one perspective, it seems pointless to split the distinction between an 'equational calculus' and an abstract 'machine' (if there is one to split). Platek though seems to have had in mind, or at least the picture of, an ordinal register machine of some sorts, which we shall turn to these later.
Ordinal length tapes
Since the Hamkins-Kidder machines can construct levels of the Gödel Lhierarchy up to a certain stage (below the level Σ alluded to above) it is a natural generalisation to think up behaviours for machines with tape not an ω sequence of cells, but longer. Indeed why not consider a sequence of cells C α for α any ordinal? Both Koepke and Dawson independently, and at roughly around the same time, came up with the idea of ordinal length tape machines, equipped with liminf rules to locate read/write heads and instruction numbers within a program list. One allows the head to move left, but again must specify if the the head is over a limit cell C λ what default action to do if the machine is asked to move left one cell. As sets can be coded by sets of ordinals (assuming the Axiom of Choice) we have some means of dealing with, or representing sets on tapes. If a machine runs and produces a sequence of 0's and 1's on a tape, then again, if of the right form, we can say that the machine is producing (codes for) sets. Dawson [Dawson (2009) ] formulated an Axiom of Computability that states that every set is computable, in that there is a program that produces (not necessarily halting) at some point a code for that set. He then proves that the computable sets form a transitive class satisfying the ZF axioms together with AC. A condensation lemma on the elements appearing in a table of a long computation then produces the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis. As the construction of the machine and its action is completely absolute in character, we can imagine the machine running inside the constructible universe L, performing the same actions with the same outcomes. Since L is the minimal transitive class model of ZF, then of course the machine is producing precisely the construcible sets.
Koepke gave a detailed description in [Koepke (2005) ], [Koepke and Koerwien (2006) ] of the organisation of such results, and whereas Dawson was considering codes for sets running on an everlasting machine, Koepke considers halting computations starting from an input tape with marks for finitely many ordinals. Koepke then shows in detail that a Bounded Truth function for L is computable. He then has: Theorem 1.6. (Koepke [Koepke (2005) ]) A set x is computable from a finite set of ordinal parameters if and only if it is a member of the constructible hierarchy.
He then proceeds to derive GCH again using this analysis. During the 1970's Silver produced a description of the constructible hierarchy using, what came to be called 'Silver Machines'. Silver's motivation was to avoid R. Jensen's 'fine-structural' description of L, which Jensen had used to great effect in establishing fundamental properties both of L, and of the universe of all sets. An account of Silver's method is in [Devlin (1984) ], Part IX. The 'machine' nature of the description is essentially that of an extremely slowed production of constructible sets, and owes more to a desire to have as simple as possible method of set construction, rather than a perspective with a mechanical flavour. Silver convincingly made use of his theory by producing a fine-structure free proof of an important combinatorial principle of L called , due to Jensen. The ordinal length tape Turing machine model held out hope that another different proof of might be possible using the machine's description. That hope has not been realised, and it seems that despite the smoothness of set construction at successor steps, the infinitary nature of the limit rule mitigates against certain construction principles that seem common to most proofs of to date, so maybe this appoach would seem difficult.
Nevertheless, the description of the constructible sets, now adds a further method of describing L besides the two originally due to Gödel, and to those of Jensen and Silver.
α-length tapes
Rather than take ON length tapes, it would be possible to consider computation using the above machines but with the length of tape, and perhaps time, restricted to say suitable ordinals α, such as initial ordinals or cardinal numbers. There would indeed be nothing against this: one could produce, say just the hereditarily countable members of L by allowing only computations that took countable lengths of time. For restricting to computations not of cardinal length, some closure considerations come into effect. In order to have effective methods of combining even very elementary processes on sets, one should require that ordinals be sufficiently closed to enable this, and something such as closure under the primitive recursive set functions (cf. [Devlin (1984) ], p.100) would be suitable.
The notion of admissible ordinal stands out, not least because of the development of α-recursion theory in the 1960's and 70's. We have briefly mentioned the origins of this theory at the beginning of this section. The motivation for its development was indeed a theoretical one: to lift from N the theory of recursion to other domains. The closure of an admissible ordinal was soon seen to result in a powerful theory of sets that when axiomatised gives essentially a reduced form of ZF, with the scheme of Replacement restricted to Σ 1 instances, and that of Comprehension to ∆ 1 . An admissible set was then a model of this theory, and L ω ck 1 , ∈ is the least transitive model of this theory (if one includes the axiom of infinity). An account of this development is contained in [Sacks (1990) ].
One could therefore simply restrict an ordinal length tape machine to an admissible ordinal length α, and consider calculations of length at most α in time.
Does one get back precisely the theory of α-recursion theory? Does "computably enumerable" correspond to α-r.e., and if so does the machine approach give any new slant on the old results from the 70's such as the Sacks-Simpson theorem [Sacks and Simpson (1972) ] that there are incomparable α-r.e. sets neither (weakly) α-recursive in the other; or the Shore Splitting and Density theorems [Shore (1975) ], [Shore (1976) 
Ordinal Register Machines
We now turn to full blooded finite register machines with the capability of ordinal entries. Again such machines are allowed to run transfinitely using an ordinary register arrangement, and finite instruction set, with a suitable liminf rules for register values and instruction numbers at limit ordinal λ lengths of time. We have mentioned that one (unpublished by Platek) approach yielded an equational calculus for ordinal recursion up to ω ck 1 , Siders and Koepke [Koepke and Siders (2006) ], consider register machines with a stack, and remarkably even a machine with finitely many registers allows one to calculate a bounded truth predicate for L. One thus can represent L both using Ordinal Register Machines (ORM) and Ordinal Time Turing Machines (OTM).
As for the ITTM's one has notions of clockable ordinal (one for which an ORM or OTM halts on say 0 input) and writable ordinal (one for which a code can be written: this is easier to formulate for an OTM: a code can be written literally on the tape; for an ORM one simply has the machine halt with the ordinal in, say the first register). For both these notions it is easier than for ITTM's to conclude that γ the supremum of the clockable ordinals is that of the writable ordinals. In [Hamkins and Miller (2009) ] it is explicitly shown how to convert calculations from an ORM to an OTM and vice versa.
Using ordinal register machines with values up to the admissible ordinal γ Hamkins and Miller have used priority arguments to produce a FriedbergMuchnik like solution to Post's problem [Hamkins and Miller (2009) ] for ORM's: they produce ORM-enumerable but incomparable sets A, B ⊂ γ that are below the appropriate notion of jump. Definition 1.13. Let P e be the e'th ORM program, the (weak) jump is the set
Although neither [Hamkins and Miller (2009) ] nor [Koepke and Siders (2006) ] make the following characterisation, it appears reasonable to argue that the ordinal γ in fact is recognisable by set theorists as the first Σ 1 -stable ordinal σ. This is defined to be the least ordinal σ so that
, that is, L σ is an elementary substructure of the universe of all sets, but only for Σ 1 sentences expressible using parameters from L σ . (See [Hinman (1978) ] p. 412 for an equivalent definition in terms of ∞-partial recursive functions.) Consequently if any ORM (or OTM) halts on integer input (or indeed any input less than γ) then the length of that computation must be also less than σ, as this halting assertion is itself a simple Σ 1 -statement in the language of set theory. (Moreover anything output by such a machine must also clearly be an ordinal less than σ by the same reasoning.) Hence γ ≤ σ. To see that σ ≤ γ observe that in the L hierarchy, new Σ 1 sentences become true in L δ for arbitrarily large ordinals δ < γ. Now given a true Σ 1 sentence in the language of set theory, run an ORM (or OTM) program to search for that ordinal δ, and then halt. This task must take more than δ (but also less than σ) steps. Hence σ = γ. One then obtains:
One can compare this with the statement that the standard Turing halting set is recursively isomorphic to the Σ 1 -truth set of L ω , ∈ where L ω = HF the class of hereditarily finite sets. A similar result holds (with the appropriate formulations) for OTM's for the same reasons.
Theoretical machine strength
We consider finally the theoretical strengths of the various types of mechanisms considered here. We have answered in one fashion at least, the capabilities of the machines in the Malament-Hogarth spacetimes, and the Etesi-Németi model in particular. It is also clear that the ON-length tape machines are full ZFC-machines that are capable of producing Gödel's constructible universe.
For the intermediate machine models we have mentioned, one could simply be satisfied by seeing at which level of complexity the machines can answer queries concerning predicates. One can however somewhat more formally, formulate a theory in which the behaviour of the machine can be represented, and one may then calibrate this theory, not necessarily proof theoretically, but at least as a theory within other theories, for example as a subsystem of second order analysis, much as is done in the Reverse Mathematics Program (see [Simpson (1999) ]). The discussion becomes somewhat technical, but for the logician, interesting.
Towards analysing the ITTM's we first look at connections to certain kinds of quasi-inductive definition that were defined earlier, at least in one form, by Burgess in [Burgess (1986) ].
Let Γ : P(ω) → P(ω) be any arithmetic operator (that is "n ∈ Γ(X)" is arithmetic; we emphasise that Γ need be neither monotone nor progressive). We define the following iterates of Γ :
Following [Burgess (1986) ], we say that Y ⊆ ω is arithmetically quasi-inductive if for some such Γ, Y is (1-1) reducible toΓ On (∅). Any such definition has a least countable ξ = ξ(Γ) with Γ ξ (∅) = Γ On (∅). If we let ζ denote the supremum of all such ξ(Γ), then we have that the ζ defined here is none other than the ζ defined above relating to ITTM's. In fact the ITTM's give an example of a recursive quasi-inductive operator that is complete for all arithmetic quasi-inductive operators. (Think: a universal ITTM can be programmed to mimick any arithmetic quasi-inductive operator.) Hence the same class of sets arises, it turns out, if one restricts to simply recursive Γ.
For any such arithmetic quasi-inductive operator Γ let us now define the repeat pair of Γ on a starting set X, as the lexicographically least pair (ζ(Γ, X), Σ(Γ, X)) with Γ ζ (X) = Γ Σ (X). Definition 1.14. AQI is the sentence: "For every arithmetic operator Γ, for every X ⊆ N, there is a wellordering W with a repeat pair (ζ(Γ, X), Σ(Γ, X)) in Field(W )". If an arithmetic operator Γ acting on X has a repeat pair, we say that Γ converges (with input X).
Then AQI can be formulated in second order number theory, and essentially is asserting that there are sufficient wellorderings for every operator on every input set X to converge. One may ask Q: What is the strength of ACA 0 + AQI? (The choice of ACA 0 , arithmetical comprehension, as a base theory is somewhat arbitrary. We refer the reader to [Simpson (1999) ] in what follows for all notions concerning these axiom systems, and determinacy hypotheses etc.) We could have equivalently reformulated a version of AQI which mentioned instead looping points of ITTM's, but this would turn out to be equivalent, as we have intimated. Π Determinacy makes an appearance here, since this theorem is the outcome of an attempt to generalise the theorem of Solovay (see [Kechris (1978) ]) that strategies for Σ [Heinatsch and Möllerfeld (2007) ]) where strategies for Bool(Σ 0 2 ) games are to be found, is less than ζ, and in fact is again a "writable" ordinal less than λ, in the sense of ITTM's. This shows that the assertion that any ITTM halts or loops, is stronger than Bool(Σ 0 2 )-Determinacy. That ∆ 1 3 CA 0 + AQI is stronger than ∆ 1 3 CA 0 in the above sense should be plausible in that the universal ITTM on input ∅ will go into a loop at the "repeat pair" ordinals ζ and Σ where L ζ ≺ Σ 2 L Σ . However it is easy to see from this Σ 2 -extendability property that any such L ζ is a Σ 2 -admissible set (where we now require the admissible set to additionally be a model of Σ 2 -Replacement) and is also a union of such. The reals of such a model then form a β-model of ∆ Σ n -machines. The notion of liminf is essentially a two quantifier alternation: "there exists a time such that for all later times....". It is possible to enquire whether there are other types of limit rule that bring out about different notions of computation, or different classes of computable function. One attempt to consider this question is a result of [Welch (2000) ] which shows that, amongst all possible Σ 2 -rules the liminf (or equivalently the limsup) rule is complete, or the most general. This is entirely unsurprising: if the universal ITTM machine can produce the constructible hierarchy up to L Σ , there is little else for it to do. Further any other Σ 2 -rule would itself produce looping behaviour between L ζ and L Σ .
One may thus broaden the enquiry and look for more complex rules. It is possible to develop a Σ 3 -machine which incorporates a Σ 3 -limit rule cf. [Friedman and Welch (2009)] ; the essential idea is that instead of taking a liminf along all ordinals one takes a liminf using only those ordinals that already bound the reapparances of earlier (shifted) snapshots. One thus has in some sense a dynamic limit rule in that the behaviour at a limit rule depends more formally on the tapes' prior contents. One then has the analogous result that a universal machine program would then have identical snapshots at the least pair (ζ(3), Σ(3)) where L ζ(3) ≺ Σ3 L Σ(3) to mirror the earlier λ-ζ-Σ theorem at Σ 2 . After Σ(3) it then returns to the previous snapshot at ζ(3) and thereafter repeats for ever. It is possible to gener-alise this to higher quantificational levels Σ n with the snapshot/looping behaviour at the appropriate pair (ζ(n), Σ(n)) lexicographically least with L ζ(n) ≺ Σn L Σ(n) . However showing these facts is more technical, and is reliant more on the underlying set theory; it thus perhaps has decreasingly less of an appeal to intuitions concerning machine computation. This is explained in [Friedman and Welch (2009) ].
ITRM's on integers The ITRM's of Miller and Koepke (2.2.2) with entries restricted to natural numbers turn out to be pleasantly strong. It is possible show that such machines are Π 1 1 -complete, in that for any Π 1 1 set A there is a program on an ITRM, that correctly accepts or rejects n depending on whether n is or is not in A. It can thus for example decide for which indices e the e'th (standard) Turing function {e} is the characteristic function of a wellorder or not. Moreover it can be shown that the strength of the machine strictly increases with the number N of registers. It is possible with 2N registers to simulate an N register machine, whilst giving as output integer codes of those programs on N registers that halt. A corollary is that there can be no such universal machine. Here we let P e,N denote the e'th ITRM program for an N register machine. Reverse Mathematics has shown that a wealth of theorems can be proven in the system Π 1 1 CA 0 . As a sample we have the following, in which we assume the ITRM is equipped with an oracle set Z ⊆ N (and a register operation to query it): Theorem 1.9. Let T ⊆ {σ | σ ∈ <N N} be a set of sequences which we consider as forming a tree. Then if Z ⊆ N codes T (via some recursive coding), the perfect kernel of T is ITRM-computable in the oracle Z.
(By the perfect kernal we mean the maximal subtree whose branches form a perfect set, that is without isolated points.) Thus, as with much of this kind of study, a seemingly simple model in fact turns out to be rather powerful.
